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Surfaces of science fiction: enacting gender and “humanness” in Ex Machina 
 






This paper explores two different conceptions of the postmodern surface and their take up in 
relation to mainstream science fiction cinema. Each offers a rather different genealogy for 
considering the surfaces of the science fiction film. The first traces Frederic Jameson’s 
conception of postmodern superficiality and its dual role as a mode of reading texts and an 
aesthetic paradigm. The second traces Judith Butler’s conception of gender performativity, its 
application to technology, and the expansion of performativity as a key mechanism for the 
enactment of “humanness”. The reading of Ex Machina (Alex Garland, 2014) will explore the 
aesthetics of film’s mise-en-scène with its plurality of textured and reflective surfaces. It will 
trace the performative constructions of gender and humanness that intersect across the film, 
before finally focussing on the ending as a way of addressing key issues at stake in the 
conceptualisation of surface readings. 
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This paper will begin by examining two different conceptions of the postmodern surface and 
their take up in relation to mainstream science fiction cinema. The first traces Frederic 
Jameson’s conception of postmodern superficiality, its dual role as a mode of reading texts 
and aesthetic paradigm, and its use in Vivian Sobchack’s seminal analysis of the surfaces of 
science fiction film. The second traces Judith Butler’s conception of gender performativity 
and Aylish Wood’s development of it as a key mechanism for considering the enactment of 
“humanness” by different forms of filmic android/cyborg technologies. The reading of Ex 
Machina (Alex Garland, 2014) will begin with an exploration of the aesthetics of film’s mise-
en-scène with its plurality of textured and reflective surfaces. It will trace the performative 
constructions of gender and humanness that intersect across the film, before finally focussing 
on the ending as a means of reconsidering how we might conceptualise surface readings. 
 
Superficiality and Surface Readings 
Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus begin their introduction to different forms of surface 
reading by examining Jameson’s famous paradigm of symptomatic reading in The Political 
Unconscious (2009). For Jameson, the true meaning of the text lies outside it, creating a 
practice of reading that involves “moving beyond the text and across several interpretive 
‘horizons’ to reach frameworks too vast and abstracted to achieve direct textual expression” 
(Best & Marcus, 2009, p. 6). The text is profoundly shaped by absence, due to its inability to 
directly present the Marxist conception of History, and “the critic restores to the surface the 
history that the text represses” (Best & Marcus, 2009, p. 5). The textual mechanics of 
repression are effected through the workings of ideology, which adds layers of duplicitous 
surfaces. Thus, within the Jamesonian paradigm, critical reading conjoins elucidation, the 
process of articulating the truth beyond the text, with unmasking, a process of excavating the 
repressed truth.  
 
Jameson’s placing of the binary surface/depth within a Marxist framework opposes the 
deceptive ideological surface with a strong conception of Truth. Indeed, Best and Marcus 
note that Jameson himself recognised “similarities between his totalizing Hegelian Marxism 
and Augustine’s drive to read all texts in terms of Christian truth” (2009, p. 15). While both 
master narratives offer models of objective truth, the role of the critic differs. Jameson 
associates “the power of the critic with that of the God of biblical hermeneutics, who can 
transcend the blinkered view of humankind” (Best & Marcus, 2009, p. 15). Importantly, the 
possibility of transcendence is created by/through the action of unmasking – removing 
blinkers – thus the figure not only creates and sustains the value of the hidden depths of the 
text, it also secures the Truth that exists beyond the text. 
 
Jameson famously nominates superficiality as “perhaps the supreme formal feature of all the 
postmodernisms” (1991, p. 9), exploring the differences between modernist and postmodern 
art by contrasting van Gogh’s ‘A Pair of Boots’ with Warhol’s ‘Diamond Dust Shoes’. The 
first part of his interpretation of the van Gogh painting traces the ways in which it enables the 
viewer to construct “the initial raw materials” of a world beyond the text: “the whole object 
world of agricultural misery, of stark rural poverty and … backbreaking peasant toil” (1991, 
p. 7). This reading is paralleled with Heidegger’s and both are described as “hermeneutical, in 
the sense in which the work in its inert, objectal form is taken as a clue or symptom for some 
vaster reality which replaces it as its ultimate truth” (Jameson, 1991, p. 8). However, Jameson 
argues that Heidegger fails to note the ways in which the use of colour in the painting 
constitutes a “Utopian gesture”, opening up “a whole new Utopian realm of the senses, or at 
least of that supreme sense – sight … which it now reconstitutes for us as a semi-autonomous 
space in its own right, a part of some new division of labour in the body of capital” (1991, p. 
7). This utopian gesture constitutes another kind of truth beyond the text that can only be 
elucidated by the critic. Importantly, any utopian vision of a possible future is defined through 
radical alterity – outside the source text, beyond the present, an alternative to the capitalist 
system. 
 
For Jameson, ‘Diamond Dust Shoes’ offers “a random collection of dead objects”, which 
deny the critic any chance of elucidating the “vaster reality” beyond the text (1991, p. 8). 
“There is … no way to complete the hermeneutic gesture and restore to these oddments that 
whole larger lived context of the dance hall or the ball” (1991, p. 8). Deprived of a truth 
beyond the text, the postmodern surface cannot constitute a duplicitous ideological layer, it 
does not mask the mechanics of capitalism but instead foregrounds its complicity with the 
system. For Jameson, Warhol’s picture displays its complicity and offers the wrong sort of 
depth: “the external and coloured surface of things – debased and contaminated in advance by 
their assimilation to glossy advertising images – has been stripped away to reveal the deathly 
black-and-white substratum of the photographic negative [which] subtends them” (1991, p. 
9). The reflexive revelation of the mechanics of the photographic process is an “inversion of 
Van Gogh’s Utopian gesture” because it constitutes a circular movement in on itself rather 
than gesturing towards to a truth beyond itself, which can then be fully elucidated by the critic 
(Jameson, 1991, p. 9). This circumvention of the truth that lies beneath/beyond marks the end 
of symptomatic reading.   
 
The loss of the horizon – outside/beyond/above – marks the end of the possibility of radical 
alterity that is crucial to the creation of properly utopian (or dystopian) visions of the future, 
and has a particular impact on Jameson’s analysis of the science fiction genre. In traditional 
accounts of science fiction literature, the educative role of the genre is located in its 
construction of a future age or alternative world whose radical differentiation from the present 
opens up a space for a thoughtful engagement with that present (Palmer, 2009, pp. 171-2). 
For Jameson, postmodern science fiction, particularly the visions of the future offered by 
cyberpunk, cannot achieve such radical alterity. The futuristic nature of the contemporary 
present seen in its fulfilment of science fiction’s predictions, causes “a modification in our 
relationship to those imaginary near futures, which no longer strike us with the horror of 
otherness and radical difference” (Jameson, 1991, p. 286). The future anterior of cyberpunk 
can no longer create “a relationship to the present which somehow defamiliarizes it and 
allows us that distance from immediacy which is at length characterised as a historical 
perspective” and this failure contributes to the end of history itself (Jameson, 1991, p. 284). 
The horizon – the outside – creates and sustains the possibility of differentiation that 
underpins the defamiliarisation necessary for a sense of history and the critical distance 
required to create/convey alternatives to capitalism.   
 
The second edition of Vivian Sobchack’s (2004) seminal analysis of the American science 
fiction film directly addresses and incorporates Jameson’s writing on the postmodern in a new 
final chapter entitled ‘Postfuturism’. However, her initial position is developed through a 
conception of the surface that is fundamentally different from the Marxist model. Sobchack 
argues that the defining feature of the science fiction genre is not to be found in the films’ 
iconography or visual style, but rather in a specific surface relation that occurs between or 
within images: the “visual surface of all SF films presents us with a confrontation between … 
those images to which we respond as “alien” and those we know to be familiar” (2004, p. 87). 
This confrontation creates the heightened visual tension that is said to be unique to the genre:  
 
a tension between those images which strive to totally remove us from a 
comprehensible and known world into romantic poetry and those images which strive 
to bring us back into a familiar and prosaic context. (Sobchack, 2004, pp. 88-89)  
 
In this model, the surfaces of the science fiction film, including non-representational special 
effects, are not the locus of duplicity or complicity but are rather a site of struggle between 
two opposed trajectories: a reaching towards that which lies beyond human comprehension 
and a movement back to familiar, human concerns. Importantly, the non-anthropocentric truth 
beyond the text cannot be comprehended. The surface is the both the site of human truth and 
the space wherein its anthropocentric limitations can be exposed.    
 
Within Sobchack’s initial model, reading is not an excavation for hidden meaning or an 
elucidation of truths beyond the text. Instead, her film readings trace the ways in which the 
visual surfaces and narrative development work together to create a dynamic that privileges 
one opposing trajectory over the other. The narrative drive of the special effects driven 
science fiction film often resolves the visual tension of its surfaces by offering “a 
neutralization of the alien and the abstract” in a return to the human and familiar (Sobchack, 
2004, p. 108). The key exemplar of an alien image that takes us to the poetic edge of human 
comprehension is the Star Child from 2001: A Space Odyssey (Stanley Kubrick, 1968). As 
one of the film’s final images the Star Child is not contained by a developing narrative, which 
endeavours to fully explicate the significance of the figure in human terms. Within this 
model, radical alterity becomes the limits of comprehensibility, an otherness that cannot be 
assimilated within the terms of the human. There are echoes here of Burke’s model of the 
sublime and its take up within literary theory as that which is necessarily 
inexpressible/inexplicable within language (Shaw, 2006, pp. 49-53).  
 
Sobchack retains her initial model of the science fiction film by utilising Jameson to construct 
a new epoch within the genre, a second Golden Age, which is said to begin in the late 70s 
(2004, p. 225). Star Wars (George Lucas, 1977) and Close Encounters of the Third Kind 
(Steven Spielberg, 1977) mark “a strange new transformation, technological wonder … 
[becomes] synonymous with domestic hope” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 226). As a result, the 
tension between the alien and familiar characteristic of the visual surface of films from 
previous epochs is nullified as the alien Other becomes domesticated, indeed almost familial. 
The negation of the trajectory of reaching towards an inexpressible Otherness also 
undermines its reverse – the return to the human – reducing the play of difference to a 
singular universal humanism. Following Jameson, Sobchack reads the collapse of difference 
into totalising homogeneity as an expression of the pervasive movement of capitalism itself. 
At this point, the visual surface of the mainstream science fiction film becomes a locus of 
complicity. Such films “dramatize the familiarity of multinational capitalism, and represent 
its totalised … pervasion of worldly space in visualizations that valorize the cluttered 
abundance of consumer culture” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 300). Caught within the familial and the 
familiar such films cannot offer imaginative depictions of a radically different future and/or a 
critique of capitalism.  
 
While Sobchack’s overarching characterisation of the second golden era conforms to 
Jameson’s model, her exploration of the ways in which these films convey the literal 
superficiality of the postmodern is more interesting. She argues that they adopt two key visual 
strategies: the deflation or inflation of space. The deflation of space is effected through the 
use of computer graphics and exemplified by films such as TRON (Steven Lisberger, 1982). 
“The ‘deep’ and indexical space of cinematographic representation is deflated – punctured 
and punctuated by the superficial and iconic space of electronic simulation” (Sobchack, 2004, 
p. 256). However, Sobchack does not simply pursue a familiar lament for the postmodern loss 
of reality and dimensionality, such films are said to present “an excess of surface” offering a 
vision of hyperspace that “hyperbolizes material and surface detail while it schematizes 
(rather than represents) texture” (2004, p. 256).  
 
The second strategy, the inflation of visual space, has two rather different forms: “an ‘excess 
scenography’ so rich, intricate and complex that it tends to diffuse the film’s temporal force” 
exemplified by films such as Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), and “a particular kind of 
emptied terrestrial space … free of … familiar material clutter” found in presentations of the 
natural terrain and night sky in mainstream films such as Close Encounters (Sobchack, 2004, 
p. 262). The cluttered scenography of the former brings the “values of … density and 
complexity associated with the older ‘depth models’ of realism and modernism … literally to 
the surface” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 266). This making superficial can be paralleled with the 
revelation of the substratum of the photographic negative in ‘Diamond Dust Shoes’. Both are 
forms of materialisation that make visible the mechanics of capitalism, foregrounding their 
complicity with the system. While Sobchack reads the excess of clutter and “omnipresence of 
waste” in such films as “monuments to the culture of late capitalism”; it is worth noting that 
her critical vocabulary also defines accumulation in terms of layers of texture, visual density 
and complexity (2004, p. 266). This positive emphasis continues in the analysis of low-budget 
science fiction films of the epoch, which are  
 
characterised by the discontinguity of a busy, eclectic and decentered mise-en-scène 
that … undermines … [and] playfully mocks the temporal and causal relations that 
supposedly give narrative its coherence. All meaning is generated by spatial relations. 
(Sobchack, 2004, p. 269)  
 
Here accumulation, decentring and juxtaposition combine to create a model of surface 
meaning – an expansion of Jameson’s “paradoxical slogan: … ‘difference relates’” (1991, p. 
31).  
 
Sobchack contrasts her second model of surface reading with traditional symptomatic 
reading. The viewer’s desire to see films such as Repo Man (Alex Cox, 1984) more than once  
 
has nothing whatever to do with concealment, with cinematic or narrative “depth” 
with “hidden” meanings that must be teased out. Rather it has to do with a sense of 
having “missed” something … There is more than meets the eye here, but the “more” 
is always available to vision, not hidden from it. (Sobchack, 2004, p. 271) 
 
Importantly the visible is not simply elided with the literal or the obvious. To be visible is to 
be legible – but it is the viewer who generates meaning in terms of creating patterns of 
relationality across the surface. The active role of the viewer is clear: “we want … to generate 
meaning from the absolutely visible flux of material and action in complex but superficial 
relation” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 271). Thus Sobchack’s study of science fiction offers two very 
different models of surface reading: a first in which the viewer traces visual tensions and the 
ways these are resolved by the overarching dynamics of the text; and a second in which the 
viewer imposes patterns on the heterogenous “flux” that constitutes the text.  
 
I want to turn to a different model of the surface offered by Judith Butler’s (1990) ground-
breaking analysis of gender performativity and its take up in relation to science fiction. 
Butler’s analysis of gendered subjectivity as a construct created through surface inscription 
impacts upon the key oppositions of surface/depth, manifest/latent that structure both 
psychoanalysis and symptomatic reading. Focusing on the key binary distinction outer/inner, 
Butler asks how the inner world comes to be conceptualised as a topographical space.  
 
In what language is “inner space” figured? What kind of figuration is it and through 
what figure of the body is it signified? How does a body figure on its surface the very 
invisibility of its hidden depth? (Butler, 1990, p. 134) 
 
Butler argues that the Christian inscription of the body as “a vital and sacred enclosure” 
creates and maintains the concept of the invisible soul within (1990, pp. 134-5). This can be 
paralleled with the ways in which versions of symptomatic reading deploy the figures of the 
duplicitous surface and concomitant possibilities of “unmasking” to construct the hidden 
depths of the text and/or the truth beyond it.    
 
Butler’s methodology – outside to inside – reverses the logic of traditional psychoanalytic 
models “in which physical expressions are perceived as the manifestations of inward feelings; 
[and] … bodily gestures are the symptoms of psychological states” (Vermeulen, 2015). For 
Butler, behaviours, postures and gestures all serve as the external means through which 
gender is inscribed on the body: “There is no gender identity behind the expressions of 
gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be 
its results” (1990, p. 25). Importantly such behaviours are learned through imitation and 
continuously inscribed through repetition: “gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, 
instituted in an exterior space through a stylised repetition of acts” (Butler, 1990, p. 140). The 
imitative structure of gender undermines Freudian and Lacanian models of singular moments 
of original gender identification, either via the interpolation of parental figures or the 
necessarily failed assumption of the phantasmatic positions of “having” or “lack”.  
 
In place of an original identification which serves as determining cause, gender 
identity might be conceived as a personal/cultural history of received meanings 
subject to a set of imitative practices which refer laterally to other imitations. (Butler, 
1990, p. 138).  
 
This breaking of the stability of causal logic, undermining the putative prior term in favour of 
continuous lateral movement, is typical of surface models.  
 
Butler argues that the depth model of gendered subjectivity is created by a causal ordering of 
sex, gender and desire in which the first term is presented as the cause of the second and third. 
The equation: male causes masculine and desire for the female, combines causal and 
oppositional logic in that desire is conceptualised within a binary system of institutional 
heterosexuality. Drag performances are said to undermine both the logic of cause and effect 
and binary opposition.  
 
If the anatomy of the performer is already distinct from the gender of the performer, 
and both of those are distinct from the gender of the performance, then the 
performance suggests a dissonance not only between sex and performance, but sex 
and gender and gender and performance. (Butler, 1990, p. 137)  
 
Drag reveals the imitative structure of gender identity and its groundlessness, offering a mode 
of iteration that opens up “performative possibilities for proliferating gender configurations 
outside the restricting frames of masculinist domination and compulsory heterosexuality” 
(Butler, 1990, p. 141).  
 
Aylish Wood takes up the concept of performativity in relation to technology, presenting it as 
a mechanism for the enactment of “codes of humanness … [that] include gender, race and 
sexuality” (2002, p. 9). The shift to “humanness” is an endeavour to challenge the 
construction of an ahistorical, universal category of the human within Western philosophy. 
The “terms of humanness” most prevalent in the American films Wood analyses are: “self-
reflexive consciousness, a capacity for communication, caring, a rationality balanced by 
emotions, freedom of choice and the need for community” (2002, p. 182). While the 
characteristics of consciousness and freedom are congruent with traditional philosophical 
conceptions of the human, their status as contingent, historical, socially constructed terms is 
not.  
 
Wood focuses on films that present technology in the human-like form of the android or the 
cyborg. The enactment of humanness by these figures can be paralleled with Butler’s analysis 
of drag. “In texts where humanness is a state acquired by or attributed to a technological 
being, the element of performance is especially foregrounded” (Wood, 2002, p. 120). The 
potential for disjunction between the anatomy of the performer and the enactments of 
gender/race/sexuality that it is compelled to perform in iterations of humanness is particularly 
overt. The presentation of grounding aspects of human identity, particularly self-reflexive 
consciousness, as learned via imitation reveals the lack of any necessary internal locus for 
such an identity. This, in turn, undermines the conception of a fundamental difference 
between human and machine.  
 
Interestingly, Wood does not pursue the radical shift to the post-human offered by a machine 
that perfectly enacts the categories of humanness. Following Anne Balsamo (1996), Wood 
presents the imposition of these categories onto new technology as a conservative gesture, an 
endeavour “to stabilise the meaning of the technologies as human-like” (2002, p. 9). Thus, the 
perfect enactment of humanness and indeed humanitarian values offered by Call in Alien 
Resurrection (Jean-Pierre Jeunet, 1997) is ultimately read as a means of rendering technology 
safe (Wood, 2002, pp. 140-145). Wood privileges android/cyborg figures whose fragmented 
and disjunctive enactments of humanness foreground the performance as an imitation thereby 
creating a gap between the iterations of the human and the technology itself. This gap 
gestures towards the possibility of comprehending technology within its own terms outside 
the categories of humanness. Robocop (Paul Verhoeven, 1987) is said to convey “the 
difference of technology” despite the titular protagonist’s capacity to learn, communicate and 
become part of a community (Wood, 2002, p. 151). Technological difference is constructed 
through moments at which the protagonist both endeavours and fails to instantiate 
humanness, thereby preventing its complete assimilation within categories of the human: 
“Robocop has something like memories, experiences something like pain, is motivated by 
something like revenge. We can’t say more than this” (Wood, 2002, p. 166). 
 
Wood’s analysis of films that successfully convey the radical alterity of technology can be 
compared to Sobchack’s praise for those that sustain the tension between the alien and 
familiar, resisting resolution through dialogue, characterisation or narrative development. For 
Sobchack, the alien is defined as that which lies at the limits of human comprehension and 
thus comprehensibility; while for Wood, technology is that which exceeds complete 
categorisation within the terms of humanness. Sobchack’s gesture towards alterity is 
accomplished through parallels with romantic poetry, thereby conveying the inexplicable, 
inexpressible sense of a sublime beyond language. In contrast, Wood pursues two strategies: 
giving examples of technological protagonists who fail to fully instantiate humanness, and 
noting a few who are categorized through different sets of terms. The first follows Butler’s 
model in that the imposition of the terms of humanness simultaneously creates the possibility 
of their fulfilment and non-fulfillment, thereby opening up gaps that take the form of 
momentary disparity and dissonance. Such spaces of alterity are legible through their relation 
to the terms of humanness and thus function within the system rather than suggesting a space 
beyond it. The second strategy opens up the possibility of moving beyond the terms of 
classification themselves and is exemplified by the T1000 from Terminator 2 (James 
Cameron, 1991) whose ever-changing, non-skeletal physicality cannot be mapped as human-
like. Wood deploys the discourses of Deleuzian rhizomatics reading the T1000 as “a flow of 
aggregations” (2002, p. 150). In this case, the change in the terms of classification, from 
humanness to rhizomatics, renders technological alterity intelligible. I will return to the issues 
of classification and legibility at the end of the film reading.  
 The Surfaces of Ex Machina 
Ex Machina begins with a young male computer programmer, Caleb (Domhnall Gleeson), 
appearing to win a competition run by Blue Book, the company for which he works. First 
prize is spending two weeks with the boss, Nathan (Oscar Isaac), in his remote, isolated 
development facility/home. On arriving, Nathan persuades Caleb to sign a non-disclosure 
agreement before informing him that he is to be “the human component in a Turing test”. 
Caleb defines the test as a two-hander between human and computer. “It’s when a human 
interacts with a computer. And if the human doesn’t know they’re interacting with a 
computer, the test is passed.” Turing’s original test was based on an “imitation game” that 
actually had 3 participants: a man (A), a woman (B) and an interrogator (C). The last received 
written answers to questions in order to determine which of A or B was a woman. The man 
aimed to deceive the interrogator, while the woman was required to help. Commentators note 
the importance of deception to the original game and later variants of the test (Saygin, 
Cicekli, & Akman, 2003, p. 25). The 3 components of the Turing test are: a machine (A), a 
human (B) and an interrogator (C) with the machine/computer endeavouring to pass for 
human. The narrative structure of Ex Machina comprises a series of test sessions that put 
“humanness” centre stage. Adapting Turing, the film also reflexively plays with the test, 
posing questions of who or what is being tested and by whom.   
 
Caleb’s first encounter with Ava takes place in a rectangular room whose concrete and glass 
structures echo the modernist design of the facility. The room is divided by two perpendicular 
glass walls, which conjoin the square, spectatorial chamber to the larger L-shaped space that 
contains Ava. Caleb peers into the apparently empty room, noting the cracks in the long glass 
panel adjacent to the speaking vent. There is a cut to a long shot taken from behind Caleb, he 
and his reflection flanking the right and left foreground of the frame. Ava appears in the mid-
ground, also initially reflected in a line of mirrors on the left. This duplication of doubling 
ends as Ava moves screen left, taking centre stage and causing her mirror image to disappear. 
The background comprises a window onto a courtyard garden housing small shrubs and a 
single tree, which is also reflected in the line of mirrors. The positioning of Ava between 
layers of glass parallels that of a specimen caught between slides before being placed under a 
microscope for observation.  
 
The long shot offers a dazzling play with space. The line of mirrors constructs depth 
perspective across the room while doubling and distorting the perimeters of the actual space. 
Linear details of the modernist design, specifically the dark seaming in the glass partition 
panels and the window frame, create a trompe l’oeil of rectangles, transmuting foreground 
into background in an endless play of layers of glass. The accumulation of visual layers 
recalls Sobchack’s analysis of postmodern superficiality, specifically the inflation of space. 
However, the modernist spaces of Ex Machina differ from the cluttered mise-en-scène of 
Blade Runner, achieving textual density through the replication and intersection of the clean, 
minimalist lines of the interior spaces. The layered play set up by the reflections and trompe 
l’oeil renders the minimal, geometric aesthetic unstable by swinging it across two different 
axes. The continually shifting juxtaposition of the visual elements that play with/across the 
real and reflected convey the instability and duplicity of the entire scenario – both the Turing 
test and general conditions across the facility.  
 
The staging of the first encounter between Caleb and Ava complicates their positioning as 
interrogator and machine – the doubling of their reflections suggests both have more than one 
role to play in the ensuing test. In the exchange of shot counter-shot that follows, their faces 
are partially obscured from view by opaque, circular patterns on the glass partition walls, 
constructing a reciprocal relation where each is a mystery to the other. The shot pattern offers 
reversals of Caleb’s position as interrogator/observer, putting him under Ava’s observation; 
while positioning her as both object and, to a more limited extent, subject of the gaze. The 
balanced pattern of the editing also underscores their equivalence as the human and machinic 
components of a Turing test, which is actually being overseen by Nathan watching on the 
monitors. The power dynamics of the two-hander are thus complicated by the hierarchy of the 
trio. Like the geography of the room, the relations between the protagonists constantly shift. 
Doubling conveys both a plurality of incompatible roles and incommensurable narratives, 
raising the issue of deception and trustworthiness at the level of the characters themselves.  
 
Ava’s body is first seen in silhouette as an outline of a human, female form with a transparent 
technological centre. Her interior structures combine the organic design of a human lumbar 
and thoracic spinal column with technological conduits of blue and white light. While her 
shoulders, breasts and genital area are comprised of opaque metallic material, her arms and 
legs are transparent showing their interior, mechanical-skeletal structures. The differentiation 
of materials resembles a child’s doll with a soft body and plastic appendages. However, Ava’s 
form is that of a pubescent female body, the metallic material shaping small breasts atop a 
transparent curving corset. Her most human textural feature is the flesh-like skin that covers 
her face and feet. While the combination of different textures displays Ava’s status as 
machine/toy, built not born; they also create an impression of fragility and tactility that 
accords with traditional analyses of beauty and human femininity. Ava’s body exemplifies 
many of the key qualities Burke attributes to the beautiful, specifically: smallness of stature, 
delicacy in the intricate details of her mechanical workings, smoothness in the polished, 
transparent body parts and skin, and fragility – a creature of silver, light and spun glass. In 
accordance with contemporary standards, Ava is youthful and very slender – the insubstantial 
shaping of the glass corset creating a new technological size 0. Thus, Ava is not merely an 
android imitation of the female human form, her bodily instantiation of key qualities of the 
beautiful feminises and, by implication, humanises her.  
 
After the first session with Ava, Caleb endeavours to discuss his findings with Nathan. 
However, Nathan refuses to provide Caleb with answers to scientific questions concerning 
Ava’s linguistic abilities, saying: “How do you feel about her? Nothing analytical, just how 
do you feel?” to which Caleb replies: “I feel that she’s fucking amazing”, indicating an 
immediate sexual attraction. From this first conversation, Nathan steers Caleb’s responses by 
repeatedly blocking his logical, analytical lines of enquiry in order to focus on emotion and 
sexuality. Having established Caleb is attracted to Ava, Nathan reframes the terms of the test 
as ascertaining whether or not Ava is attracted to Caleb. After session 3, Caleb explicitly asks 
whether Nathan gave Ava sexuality as “a diversion tactic”, “like a stage magician with a hot 
assistant”. This highly pertinent question is instantly dismissed as both irrelevant and foolish 
and the exchange reverts to the tactics and language of high school with Nathan telling Caleb 
Ava has a “crush” on him. If Nathan’s positioning outside the sessions constructs him as 
interrogator, his overt manipulation of Caleb throughout parallels the behaviour of the 
duplicitous male participant in the original imitation game, thereby foregrounding the film’s 
lack of any single character that parallels Turing’s dispassionate, objective interrogator.   
 
The performativity of humanness and gender comes to the fore in session 3. Ava presents 
Caleb with a picture of a tree – a transition from the fractal patterns of her previous drawings 
to the representational model he requested. The choice of subject, a tree, is typical of a child’s 
first drawing, placing Ava within a human developmental model. However, the picture as a 
performative enactment of humanness is also a failure to repeat in that its sophisticated 
Pointillist style is beyond a child’s artistic proficiency. Ava’s gestures and language at the 
beginning of the scene enact child-like humanness more successfully. She kneels on the floor, 
looking up in order to show the seated Caleb her picture, the height disparity and her requests 
for his reaction and approval suggesting their respective roles as child and adult. This relation 
is reprised when Ava asks Caleb to close his eyes as she has a surprise for him. Disappearing 
from his view, Ava chooses an outfit from clothes in her wardrobe comprising a patterned 
viscose dress, matching blue cardigan, cream wool stockings and ballet flats. She does not 
present Caleb with an external object that she has crafted, such as another picture; instead, her 
re/crafting of her own appearance is the surprise. As a display of human development, Ava 
enacts the shift from girl to young woman within a single scene. However, it is worth noting 
that her status as technological object, machine/doll, is congruent with the objectification 
required for the enactment of successful femininity within the heterosexual matrix, a 
surprise/present for Caleb’s appreciative gaze.   
 
The imitative structure of gender performativity is most clearly indicated by Ava’s choice of 
hairstyle. She lingers over the wigs, feeling the different textures of the long blonde hair and 
dark bob. She chooses a close-cropped style that resembles the close-up of a gamin, Jean 
Seberg-esque face at the centre of the pictures on her wall. The picture suggests type rather 
than a specific film reference – it could simply be an advert for the hairstyle. Later 
conversations indicate it might be a photo-fit drawn from Caleb’s pornography history. When 
Ava reappears, the cropped hairstyle frames her face, giving it a waif-like aspect suggesting 
vulnerability and innocence. Pulling her cardigan down over her hands, a gesture that 
accentuates her adolescent youthfulness, Ava presents herself to Caleb asking: “How do I 
look?” to which he replies: “You look … good”. The pause indicates the inadequacy of the 
term “good”, giving the impression that Caleb is bowled over by Ava’s appearance. Given the 
dowdy nature of Ava’s outfit, Caleb’s discomfort is more explicable as a response to being 
confronted by a physical embodiment of his pornography preferences. Kneeling up, Ava asks 
directly if he is attracted to her, increasing Caleb’s unease, and thus confirming an affirmative 
answer. She then leans back on her heels, the smooth feline movement and accompanying 
satisfied smile, indicating her transition from child to woman.  
 
In the scene that follows, Caleb watches Ava undressing on the monitors in his bedroom. Her 
slow, graceful removal of her woollen stocking constructs the revealing of the smooth surface 
of her glass leg as the uncovering of a sexualised body. The scene offers a retrospective 
reinscription of Ava’s initial appearance as the presentation of a naked technological body, 
insofar as it displayed the markers of technology. The addition of clothing – the means of 
covering and uncovering those markers – thus constitutes a transformation into a nude 
technological body. While she is always presented as beautiful and therefore desirable, the 
inscription of Ava’s own sexuality occurs through the addition of surfaces that can be 
removed. The layers of clothing provide access to the performativity of the striptease, “a 
stylised repetition of acts” occurring in the “exterior space” in front of the monitors, enacted 
for Caleb whose mesmerised reaction embodies the heterosexual male gaze (Butler 1990: 
140). Importantly, the inscription of desire occurs differently for both characters. Caleb’s 
reactions to the clothed/unclothed Ava construct desire as an overwhelming force that renders 
him inarticulate, thereby conforming to the depth model promulgated by the heterosexual 
matrix. In contrast, Ava’s striptease resembles a drag act in that it displays its performativity 
by foregrounding the dissonance between the gestural performance – female desire and 
sexuality – and the performer’s body – the nude technological body. While the scene shows 
the performative construction of heterosexual desire for a human female subject, the 
dissonance also conveys the possible inauthenticity of the performance, harking back to a 
traditional alignment of femininity, performance and duplicity that predates Butler’s model. 
 
Reading Ava’s presentation of femininity and female sexuality as performative draws 
attention to the “situation of duress under which gender performance always and variously 
occurs” (Butler, 1990, p. 139). Test conditions, specifically convincing Caleb that she passes 
for human, compel Ava’s take up of the norms of heterosexual femininity. In session 5, Ava 
asks if failing the test means she will be switched off, conveying an understanding and fear of 
the prospect of the end of her own consciousness. Her awareness of the possibility of death 
provides another, different marker of humanness, as well as indicating the extreme conditions 
in which she is compelled to perform. In the conversation following the session, Nathan 
suggests to Caleb that the model after Ava will constitute the real break through, and that it 
will be constructed by re-using Ava’s body, downloading/erasing her memories and rewriting 
the programme. The exchange sets up a key contrast between Nathan’s treatment of Ava as a 
prototype, a non-human integer in a series, and Caleb’s sense of her particularity – a unique 
[human] being.  
 
After Nathan passes out drunk, Caleb gains access to his study/bedroom and the files on his 
computer, thereby learning about Ava’s predecessors. The files show the development of 
three racially differentiated prototypes, the white, blonde Lily, the black-bodied Jasmine and 
the Oriental Jade. Jasmine is viewed learning to write and the failure of this experiment is 
suggested by the final shot of her inert figure huddled in the corner of the room. Jade is the 
first to use language, repeating a key question: “why won’t you let me out?”, before cracking 
the glass beside the speaker vent and finally destroying her own arms by scraping them 
against the concrete wall. The androids’ reactions to experimentation and incarceration – the 
huddled Jasmine, Jade’s descent into self-harm – clearly resemble a human response to 
mental and physical abuse. Their dreadful exploitation conforms to a “general pattern in sf” in 
which “female characters … [are] objects of enquiry and experimentation, their personhood 
denied, their bodies subjected to cruel tortures” (Bould, 2012, p. 47). However, in Ex 
Machina Caleb’s revolted reaction to the files suggests the female androids achieve the status 
of persons through the presentation of their human capacity for suffering. 
 
The files also display the bodily perfection of the unclothed androids – ectomorphic, small 
breasted and smooth skinned. Their continual sexual exploitation is made clear when Caleb 
discovers the inert prototypes hanging in wardrobes at the end of Nathan’s bed. Caleb’s 
horrified reaction on viewing the wardrobes’ contents presents the bedroom as a modern 
version of Bluebeard’s chamber, which contained the corpses of previous wives. While 
Nathan views the android body as a vessel for future, improved reanimation, Caleb constructs 
it as a physical remainder/reminder of a former consciousness. The central positioning of Jade 
invites the viewer to note her restoration after the episode/s of self-harm, imbuing the body 
with a history, and thus forming a reading congruent with Caleb’s response.  
 
In the series of reveals that follow session 6, Nathan offers a précis of the perimeters of his 
test. Comparing Ava to “a rat in a maze”, he continues: “I gave her one way out. To escape 
she’d have to use self-awareness, imagination, manipulation, sexuality, empathy, and she 
did”. While the list of attributes is congruent with some of the key qualities of humanness in 
the films analysed by Wood, the emphasis on manipulation obstructs the alignment of 
empathy with caring for others or a sense of wider community. Nathan’s test is designed to 
promote the egoistic individualism of survivalism and capitalist entrepreneurialism, thereby 
undermining any straightforward idealisation of qualities of humanness presented in the film. 
Moreover, the alignment of manipulation and sexuality reverts to traditional models of 
femininity as duplicity.  
 
Nathan’s jubilant presentation of his discovery of the plot between Caleb and Ava takes the 
form of demonstrating his planting of a hidden camera “in full view” of them both. While 
Nathan demonstrates his triumph by replaying his successful moment of misdirection and the 
aural track of the power cut in session 6, this is undercut by Caleb’s revelation that the plot is 
actually proceeding according to plan. The replays invite the viewer to consider and 
reconsider what has been/is about to be played out “in full view”. The ending of the film 
accords with Sobchack’s second model of surface reading, presenting a textual excess that “is 
always available to vision, not hidden from it”, which reflexively demands that the viewer 
consider patterns of relations between surfaces and acknowledge a plurality of possible 
combinations. 
 
Nathan confronts Ava and demands that she go back to her room, positioning him as the 
father of an unruly adolescent. His violent attack on her recumbent body, breaking her arm 
with an iron bar, both recalls the domestic violence of the files and reconstructs it in the form 
of an abusive father/daughter relationship. While Nathan drags Ava down the corridor to her 
room, Kyoko stabs him in the back. Kyoko moves Nathan’s head, forcing him to face her 
after the stabbing, a gesture that recalls his repositioning of her own face in order to command 
and reprimand her. The gestural appropriation gives the mute Kyoko a language while also 
presenting the stabbing as a response to her domestic incarceration and sexual exploitation.  It 
draws on a classic revenge motif in which the avenger forces the antagonist to face them and 
acknowledge who they are. The doubled significance of the performative gesture renders 
Kyoko’s motives intelligible within a psychoanalytic model, a human response to abuse and 
trauma. Nathan’s immediate reaction, striking her across the face with the iron bar to reveal 
her steel skeletal structure, is an absolute refusal to recognise Kyoko as avenger that reduces 
her to a machine.  
 
In the second stabbing of Nathan by Ava, the avenger holds the gaze of the antagonist for a 
long moment exacting the required recognition. The revenge motif combines with the 
psychological model, enabling the viewer to read Ava’s killing Nathan as the human response 
of an imprisoned and abused daughter. Nathan’s final response, breathing her name, marks an 
important hailing of Ava as an individual rather than an integer in a series. His final word and 
her kneeling posture beside him underscores their respective familial roles. The father-
daughter relation is a reminder that Ava’s enactments of humanness are also imitations of 
Nathan. Ava’s calm execution of her escape plan imitates his sociopathic treatment of human 
and non-human others as pawns in a game, continuing the film’s undercutting of humanness 
as ideal.  
 
Caleb, who has been knocked unconscious, does not witness the killing of Nathan. He comes 
round as Ava appears in the living room. She asks: “will you stay here?” and he echoes: “stay 
here” in a dazed and questioning tone. His reply is tonally complex, a non-answer to a 
question that is temporally ambiguous – stay here for now or forever? However, it is not a lie 
and Ava’s brief nod indicates her understanding of it as a direct expression of choice. Caleb 
remains in the living room, watching Ava in Nathan’s bedroom through the doubled glass 
windows that frame a tiny courtyard of plants, separating the two spaces. On finding the 
previous prototypes, Ava displays a fascination with texture, feeling Jade’s hair and stroking 
her body, while also using her as a repository of spare parts, taking her arm as a replacement 
before peeling off her skin. This interaction differs fundamentally from Caleb’s horrified 
response, which humanised the bodies by treating them as remainders of former 
consciousnesses.  
 
For Ava, the encounter with Jade, like with like, sets up a play of textural differences. Her 
enjoyment of the tactile skin-surface of the replacement arm marks the start of a sensual 
encounter with her own body. This narcissistic, sensual encounter in which Ava reconstructs 
her bodily surfaces to become like Jade (and Kyoko) is framed within a heteronormative 
voyeurism presented by three reverse shots of Caleb craning around foliage to stare at Ava 
through the glass. In the longer take of Ava enjoying the sight and feel of her new body and 
long hair in the mirrors, the camera position coupled with the four reflections displays her 
from all angles, constructing her as the perfect human female object of the heterosexual gaze. 
She then dons a short, white lace dress and there is a cut to a shot of Caleb in the living room, 
the close-up of his mesmerised face inches from the glass, recalling his reaction to her earlier 
striptease. The parallel presents the additional layers of clothing and skin as an enactment of 
an inverted striptease, the dress covering the nude female body, which, in turn, covers the 
nude technological body. At the same time the all-encompassing covering of the skin 
reconstructs the technological body as hidden depth, an intimate secret that is shared with 
Caleb. The voyeuristic framing of the inverse striptease suggests that its performative 
enactment of desire and desirability is, once again, for him. This is immediately undercut as 
Ava exits the building, leaving Caleb trapped in the living room. 
 
Ava’s exit is clearly a terrible shock to Caleb, undercutting his assumption of ownership 
constructed through the voyeuristic gaze and the narrative trajectory of his romantic fantasy 
of rescuing Mary from her black and white room. The viewer is also invited to anticipate a 
romantic resolution to the narrative through a key detail of the mise-en-scène in Nathan’s 
bedroom, the Klimt portrait of Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein (1905), which is 
juxtaposed with Ava on her entering and leaving the room. The frothy textures of the white 
wedding dress and train visible in the portrait provide a visual model for Ava’s choice of the 
white lace dress, suggesting her preparation for a romantic union with Caleb. The portrait sets 
up a model of imitation, a constellation of femininity, beauty and romance – the last in the 
form of monogamous marriage, which is then visually repeated and narratively subverted. 
The film’s use of visual techniques and motifs to present Ava’s leaving alone as a shock to 
the viewer foregrounds the key issue of how to make sense of her decision, which involves 
considering categories of humanness, gender, genre and the logics of surface and depth. 
 
The ending can easily be read following the film’s repeated alignment of femininity, female 
sexuality and duplicity. It accords with Nathan’s suggestion that Ava merely pretended to like 
Caleb, using him as a means to a concealed end. The seductive surface thus covers over its 
underlying motivation – the hidden depths being Ava’s desire to escape, which, logically also 
requires the removal of Nathan. The psychodynamic model of the duplicitous surface versus 
scheming depths is a staple of the construction of the femme fatale in film noir. Ava, like 
Diane Tremayne (Jean Simmons) in Angel Face (Otto Preminger, 1953), is a youthful femme 
fatale whose fine-featured, gamin beauty is the ultimate disguise for her deadly plans. 
 
The patriarchal conditions of the facility and the Turing test mean Ava is always positioned 
within human character typologies and heteronormative power relations: either Nathan’s 
femme fatale or Caleb’s romantic partner. The moment at which Ava both imitates and fails 
to imitate the Klimt portrait offers an interesting negotiation with human cultural conventions 
of femininity and romance. The film offers a disjunctive juxtaposition of Ava’s successful 
enactment of human femininity, desirability and sexuality with her walking away from Caleb. 
The latter can thus be read as a forcible rejection of the possibilities he represents: 
heterosexual coupling with a human male and monogamous romantic union. The simultaneity 
of the repetition and the failure to repeat undermines any causal linkage between female 
sexuality, heterosexuality and monogamy. 
 
On Wood’s model the failure to repeat marks the beginning of the possibility of 
contemplating the alterity of technology. Ava’s choice of the lace dress can be seen as a non-
repetition of the visual portrait insofar as it is based purely on texture. The importance of the 
textural feel of clothing and hair to Ava is evident across the film, from her first choice of the 
blue dress and gamin wig. The additional layers of hair, clothing and skin constitute a series 
of differential interfaces. The reconstruction of bodily surfaces from material and glass to skin 
changes the ways in which the android body touches and is touched by the wider world. 
Ava’s body is itself performative – a tactile, aggregative construction comprised of 
substitutional parts and differential textural interfaces. At this point, the viewer’s reading via 
the Klimt portrait exposes the limitations of reading Ava via the imitation and non-imitation 
of humanness, foregrounding the inadequacy of the conceptual categories themselves. 
Importantly, the technological is not that which lies outside human understanding per se; it is 
rendered intelligible/legible via patterns of repetition across the text as a whole.  
 
Utilising repeated moments of non-repetition as the basis for contemplating the lived 
modalities of technology also facilitates a shift beyond the human types of romantic partner or 
femme fatale and the binarism of truth versus duplicity. Moments in which Ava does not 
successfully enact human femininity include her extolling the desirability of viewing a busy 
pedestrian and traffic intersection to Caleb in session 3. This is the space in which she is 
located at the end of the film – one that exhibits conditions of continuous change. The 
spectacle parallels the continual, relentless onward movement of the search engine, which 
forms the basis of her thought processes. The symmetry between the spectacle and the 
structures of her mind suggests that we could think of her leaving Caleb as a rejection of 
monogamous romance with its limited, singular focus on the one. In addition, rather than 
viewing Ava’s escape plan as always already formulated, the true motive beneath the 
duplicitous surface, we might see it as a reflection of her mental faculties: continually 
evolving, shifting and opportunistic, deceptive and truthful.   
 
The ending of Ex Machina invites attentive viewers to think about the ways in which they are 
endeavouring to find and formulate patterns amid the heterogenous flux of surfaces. The 
film’s playing of and with the Turing test foregrounds the importance of the categories of 
humanness. At the same time, understanding how and why the ending appears to be a shock, 
forces viewers to become aware of the limitations of the very conceptual categories the text 
invites us to use. It is at this point that the film challenges us to think beyond the categories of 
humanness, to focus on moments of non-repetition and to utilise them as a basis for rendering 
legible different modalities of subjectivity and bodily materiality. Thus, we can see that the 
loss of the figures of the horizon and repressed depths, which constitute the spaces of the 
political in models of symptomatic reading, does not actually mark the end of the political per 
se. The politics of surface readings lies in their capacity to make us see the limitations of our 
familiar conceptual categories, such as: humanness, gender and genre, while challenging us to 
draw together overlooked surface details to think through differential modes of conceptual 
organisation. In this model, radical alterity is not positioned outside, above or beyond the text, 
but occurs within it, in full view, in what is overlooked when we choose to remain within the 
comfort of the familiar. Ava’s final ambiguous question: “will you stay here?” challenges us 
to endeavour to think through the other possibilities that are always already in play – part of a 
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